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Court of International Justice
Status of South-West Africa (Namibia)
In its issue for July, 1971, The International Lawyer published a r~sum6
of the long and devious history of the Quest for the Legal Status of the
Mandate given by the League of Nations to South Africa over Namibia
(South-West Africa). 5 Int. Lawyer 549 ff.
Attention was called to the request of the Security Council to the
International Court of Justice for an Advisory Opinion on the question:
"What are the legal consequences for States of the continued presence of
South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970)?"
This resolution, it will be remembered, established an ad hoc subcom-
mittee to study ways and means by which the various relevant resolutions
of the Council on this subject could be implemented effectively. Oral
arguments were completed before the Court on March 17, 1971.
The article stated that "it is possible that the Court's advisory opinion
will have been rendered by the time of publication of this note"; and
readers were promised a report of that opinion "promptly after its rendi-
tion."
On 21 June, 1971, the opinions of the Court were delivered at The
Hague, and a r6sum6 thereof is reproduced herewith:
In answer to the question put by the Security Council of the United
Nations, the Court is of opinion,
by 13 votes to 2,
(1) that, the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being ille-
gal, South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administration from
Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the Territory;
by 11 votes to 4,
(2) that States Members of the United Nations are under obligation to
recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and the in-
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validity of its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia, and to refrain from
any acts and in particular any dealings with the Government of South Africa
implying recognition of the legality of, or lending support or assistance to,
such presence and administration; and
(3) that it is incumbent upon States which are not Members of the
United Nations to give assistance, within the scope of subparagraph (2)
above, in the action which has been taken by the United Nations with regard
to Namibia.
Course of the Proceedings
(paragraphs 1-18 of the Advisory Opinion)
The Court first recalls that the request for the advisory opinion ema-
nated from the United Nations Security Council, which decided to submit
it by resolution 284 (1970) adopted on 29 July 1970. The Court goes on to
recapitulate the different steps in the subsequent proceedings.
It refers in particular to the three Orders of 26 January 1971 whereby
the Court decided not to accede to the objections raised by the Govern-
ment of South Africa against the participation in the proceedings of three
Members of the Court. These objections were based on statements which
the judges in question had made in a former capacity as representatives of
their governments in United Nations organs dealing with matters con-
cerning Namibia, or on their participation in the same capacity in the work
of those organs. The Court came to the conclusion that none of the three
cases called for the application of Article 17, paragraph 2, of its Statute.
Objections Against the Court's Dealing with the Question
(paras. 19-41 of the Advisory Opinion)
The Government of South Africa contended that the Court was not
competent to deliver the opinion, because Security Council resolution 284
(1970) was invalid for the following reasons: (a) two permanent members
of the Council abstained during the voting (Charter of the United Nations,
Art. 27, para. 3); (b) as the question related to a dispute between South
Africa and other Members of the United Nations, South Africa should
have been invited to participate in the discussion (Charter, Art. 32) and the
proviso requiring members of the Security Council which are parties to a
dispute to abstain from voting should have been observed (Charter, Art.
27, para 3). The Court points out that (a) for a long period the voluntary
abstention of a permanent member has consistently been interpreted as not
constituting a bar to the adoption of resolutions by the Security Council;
(b) the question of Namibia was placed on the agenda of the Council as a
situation and the South African Government failed to draw the Council's
attention to the necessity in its eyes of treating it as a dispute.
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In the alternative the Government of South Africa maintained that even
if the Court had competence, it should nevertheless, as a matter of judicial
propriety, refuse to give the opinion requested, on account of political
pressure to which, it was contended, the Court had been or might be
subjected. On 8 February 1971, at the opening of the public sittings, the
President of the Court declared that it would not be proper for the Court to
entertain those observations, bearing as they did on the very nature of the
Court as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, an organ
which, in that capacity, acts only on the basis of law, independently of all
outside influences or interventions whatsoever.
The Government of South Africa also advanced another reason for not
giving the advisory opinion requested: that the question was in reality
contentious, because it related to an existing dispute between South Africa
and other States. The Court considers that it was asked to deal with a
request put forward by a United Nations organ with a view to seeking legal
advice on the consequences of its own decisions. The fact that, in order to
give its answer, the Court might have to pronounce on legal questions upon
which divergent views exist between South Africa and the United Nations
does not convert the case into a dispute between States. (There was
therefore no necessity to apply Article 83 of the Rules of Court, according
to which, if an advisory opinion is requested upon a legal question "ac-
tually pending between two or more States," Article 31 of the Statute,
dealing with judges ad hoc, is applicable. The Government of South Africa
having requested leave to choose a judge ad hoc, the Court heard its
observations on that point on 27 January 1971 but, in the light of the above
considerations, decided by the Order of 29 January 1971 not to accede to
that request.)
In sum, the Court saw no reason to decline to answer the request for an
advisory opinion.
History of the Mandate
(paras. 42-86 of the Advisory Opinion)
Refuting the contentions of the South African Government and citing its
own prouncements in previous proceedings concerning South West Africa
(Advisory Opinions of 1950, 1955 and 1956; Judgment of 1962), the Court
recapitulates the history of the Mandate.
The mandates system established by Article 22 of the Covenant of the
League of Nations was based upon two principles of paramount impor-
tance: the principle of non-annexation and the principle that the well-being
and development of the peoples concerned formed a sacred trust of civ-
ilisation. Taking the developments of the past half-century into account,
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there can be little doubt that the ultimate objective of the sacred trust was
self-determination and independence. The mandatory was to observe a
number of obligations, and the Council of the League was to see that they
were fulfilled. The rights of the mandatory, as such, had their foundation in
those obligations.
When the League of Nations was dissolved, the raison d'&re and origi-
nal object of these obligations remained. Since their fulfillment did not
depend on the existence of the League, they could not be brought to an end
merely because the supervisory organ had ceased to exist. The Members of
the League had not declared, or accepted even by implication, that the
mandates would be cancelled or lapse with the dissolution of the League.
The last resolution of the League Assembly and Article 80, paragraph 1,
of the United Nations Charter maintained the obligations of mandatories.
The International Court of Justice has consistently recognized that the
Mandate survived the demise of the League, and South Africa also admit-
ted as much for a number of years. Thus the supervisory element, which is
an essential part of the Mandate, was bound to survive. The United
Nations suggested a system of supervision which would not exceed that
which applied under the mandates system, but this proposal was rejected
by South Africa.
Resolutions by the General Assembly and the Security Council
(paras. 87- 116 of the Advisory Opinion)
Eventually, in 1966, the General Assembly of the United Nations
adopted resolution 2145 (XXI), whereby it decided that the Mandate was
terminated and that South Africa had no other right to administer the
Territory. Subsequently the Security Council adopted various resolutions
including resolution 276 (1970) declaring the continued presence of South
Africa in Namibia illegal. Objections challenging the validity of these
resolutions having been raised, the Court points out that it does not
possess powers of judicial review or appeal in relation to the United
Nations organs in question. Nor does the validity of their resolutions form
the subject of the request for advisory opinion. The Court nevertheless, in
the exercise of its judicial function, and since these objections have been
advanced, considers them in the course of its reasoning before determining
the legal consequences arising from those resolutions.
It first recalls that the entry into force of the United Nations Charter
established a relationship between all Members of the United Nations on
the one side, and each mandatory Power on the other, and that one of the
fundamental principles governing that relationship is that the party which
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disowns or does not fulfill its obligations cannot be recognized as retaining
the rights which it claims to derive from the relationship. Resolution 2145
(XXI) determined that there had been a material breach of the Mandate,
which South Africa had in fact disavowed.
It has been contended (a) that the Covenant of the League of Nations
did not confer on the Council of the League power to terminate a mandate
for misconduct of the mandatory and that the United Nations could not
derive from the League greater powers than the latter itself had; (b) that,
even if the Council of the League had possessed the power of revocation of
the Mandate, it could not have been exercised unilaterally but only in
co-operation with the Mandatory; (c) that resolution 2145 (XXI) made
pronouncements which the General Assembly, not being a judicial organ,
was not competent to make; (d) that a detailed factual investigation was
called for; and (e) that one part of resolution 2145 (XXI) decided in effect
a transfer of territory.
The Court observes (a) that, according to a general principle of in-
ternational law (incorporated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties), the right to terminate a treaty on account of breach must be
presumed to exist in respect of all treaties even if unexpressed; (b) that the
consent of the wrongdoer to such a form of termination cannot be required;
(c) that the United Nations, as a successor to the League, acting through
its competent organ, must be seen above all as the supervisory institution
competent to pronounce on the conduct of the Mandatory; (d) that the
failure of South Africa to comply with the obligation to submit to supervi-
sion cannot be disputed; and (e) that the General Assembly was not
making a finding on facts, but formulating a legal situation; and it would not
be correct to assume that, because it is in principle vested with recommen-
datory powers, it is debarred from adopting, in special cases within the
framework of its competence, resolutions which make determinations or
have operative design.
The General Assembly, however, lacked the necessary powers to ensure
the withdrawal of South Africa from the Territory and therefore, acting in
accordance with Article 11, paragraph 2, of the Charter, enlisted the
co-operation of the Security Council. The Council for its part, when it
adopted the resolutions concerned, was acting in the exercise of what it
deemed to be its primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and
security. Article 24 of the Charter vests in the Security Council the
necessary authority. Its decisions were taken in conformity with the pur-
poses and principles of the Charter, under Article 25 of which it is for
member States to comply with those decisions, even those members of the
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Security Council which voted against them and those Members of the
United Nations who are not members of the Council.
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia
(paras. 117-127 and 133 of the Advisory Opinion)
The Court stresses that a binding determination made by a competent
organ of the United Nations to the effect that a situation is illegal cannot
remain without consequence.
South Africa, being responsible for having created and maintained that
situation, has the obligation to put an end to it and withdraw its adminis-
tration from the Territory. By occupying the Territory without title, South
Africa incurs international responsibilities arising from a continuing viola-
tion of an international obligation. It also remains accountable for any
violations of the rights of the people of Namibia, or of its obligations under
international law towards other States in respect of the exercise of its
powers in relation to the Territory.
The member States of the United Nations are under obligation to recog-
nize the illegality and invalidity of South Africa's continued presence in
Namibia and to refrain from lending any support or any form of assistance
to South Africa with reference to its occupation of Namibia. The precise
determination of the acts permitted-what measures should be selected,
what scope they should be given and by whom they should be applied-is a
matter which lies with the competence of the appropriate political organs of
the United Nations acting within their authority under the Charter. Thus it
is for the Security Council to determine any further measures consequent
upon the decisions already taken by it. The Court in consequence con-
fines itself to giving advice on those dealings with the Government of
South Africa which, under the Charter of the United Nations and general
international law, should be considered as inconsistent with resolution 276
(1970) because they might imply recognizing South Africa's presence in
Namibia as legal:
(a) Member States are under obligation (subject to (d) below) to abstain
from entering into treaty relations with South Africa in all cases in which the
Government of South Africa purports to act on behalf of or concerning
Namibia. With respect to existing bilateral treaties, member States must
abstain from invoking or applying those treaties or provisions of treaties
concluded by South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia which involve
active inter-governmental co-operation. With respect to multilateral treaties,
the same rule cannot be applied to certain general conventions such as those
with humanitarian character, the non-performance of which may adversely
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affe'ct the people of Namibia: it will be for the competent international organs
to take specific measures in this respect.
(b) Member States are under obligation to abstain from sending diplo-
matic or special missions to South Africa including in their jurisdiction the
territory of Namibia, to abstain from sending consular agents to Namibia, and
to withdraw any such agents already there; and to make it clear to South
Africa that the maintenance of diplomatic or consular relations does not
imply any recognition of its authority with regard to Namibia.
(c) Member States are under obligation to abstain from entering into
economic and other forms of relations with South Africa on behalf of or
concerning Namibia which may entrench its authority over the territory.
(d) However, non-recognition should not result in depriving the people
of Namibia of any advantages derived from international co-operation. In
particular, the illegality or invalidity of acts performed by the Government of
South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the termination of the
Mandate cannot be extended to such acts as the registration of births, deaths
and marriages.
As to States not members of the United Nations, although they are not
bound by Articles 24 and 25 of the Charter, they have been called upon by
resolution 276 (1970) to give assistance in the action which has been taken
by the United Nations with regard to Namibia. In the view of the Court,
the termination of the Mandate and the declaration of the illegality of South
Africa's presence in Namibia are opposable to all States in the sense of
barring erga omnes the legality of the situation which is maintained in
violation of international law. In particular, no State which enters into
relations with South Africa concerning Namibia may expect the United
Nations or its Members to recognize the validity or effects of any such
relationship. The Mandate having been terminated by a decision of the
international organization in which the supervisory authority was vested, it
is for non-member States to act accordingly. All States should bear in mind
that the entity injured by the illegal presence of South Africa in Namibia is
a people which must look to the international community for assistance in
its progress towards the goals for which the sacred trust was instituted.
Accordingly, the Court has given the replies reproduced above on page
193.
Propositions by South Africa Concerning the Supply of
Further Factual Information and the Possible
Holding of a Plebiscite
(paras. 128- 132 of the Advisory Opinion)
The Government of South Africa had expressed the desire to supply the
Court with further factual information concerning the purposes and objec-
tives of its policy of separate development, contending that to establish a
International Lawyer, Vol. 6, No. I
200 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
breach of its substantive international obligations under the Mandate it
would be necessary to prove that South Africa had failed to exercise its
powers with a view to promoting the well-being and progress of the in-
habitants. The Court found that no factual evidence was needed for the
purpose of determining whether the policy of apartheid in Namibia was in
conformity with the international obligations assumed by South Africa. It
is undisputed that the official governmental policy pursued by South Africa
in Namibia is to achieve a complete physical separation of races and ethnic
groups. This means the enforcement of distinctions, exclusions, restrictions
and limitations exclusively based on grounds of race, colour, descent or
national or ethnic origin which constitute a denial of fundamental human
rights. This the Court views as a flagrant violation of the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
The Government of South Africa had also submitted a request that a
plebiscite should be held in the Territory of Namibia under the joint
supervision of the Court and the Government of South Africa. The Court
having concluded that no further evidence was required, that the Mandate
had been validly terminated and that in consequence South Africa's pres-
ence in Namibia was illegal and its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia
illegal and invalid, it was not able to entertain this proposal.
By a letter of 14 May 1971 the President informed the representatives of
the States and organizations which had participated in the oral proceedings
that the Court had decided not to accede to the two above-mentioned
requests.
Declaration and Separate or Dissenting Opinions
Subparagraph I of the operative clause of the Advisory Opinion (Illegal-
ity of the presence of South Africa in Namibia) was adopted by 13 votes to
2. Subparagraphs 2 and 3 were adopted by II votes to 4.
Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice (dissenting opinion) considers that the
Mandate was not validly revoked, that the Mandatory is still subject to the
obligations of the Mandate whatever these may be, and that States Mem-
bers of the United Nations are bound to respect the position unless and
until it is changed by lawful means.
Judge Gros (dissenting opinion) disagrees with the Court's conclusions
as to the legal validity and effects of General Assembly resolution 2145
(XXI), but considers that South Africa ought to agree to negotiate on the
conversion of the Mandate into a United Nations trusteeship.
Judges Petr6n and Onyeama (separate opinions) voted for subparagraph
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I of the operative clause but against subparagraphs 2 and 3, which, in their
view, ascribe too broad a scope to the effects of non-recognition.
Judge Dillard (separate opinion), concurring in the operative clause,
adds certain mainly cautionary comments on subparagraph 2.
Judges Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Gros, Petr6n, Onyeama and Dillard also
criticize certain decisions of the Court with reference to its composition.
The President (declaration) and Judges Padilla Nervo and de Castro
(separate opinions) accept the operative clause in full.
The Vice-President (separate opinion), while sharing the views ex-
pressed in the Advisory Opinion, considers that the operative clause is not
sufficiently explicit or decisive.
It will be interesting to learn how the opinion of the Court, together with
the action of the General Assembly in terminating the mandate of South
Africa over Namibia [Resolution 2145 (XXI)], will be implemented and
given force and effect.
India vs. Pakistan
On 30 August the Government of India filed in the Registry of the Court
an Application instituting proceedings against Pakistan.
The case has its origin in India's decision in February 1971 no longer to
permit the overflying of its territory by Pakistan aircraft. The case con-
cerns the question of whether the Council of the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization (a specialized agency of the United Nations) has jurisdic-
tion to deal with a complaint by Pakistan against that decision.
The Application states that India and Pakistan are parties to two in-
struments concluded at Chicago in 1944: the Convention on International
Civil Aviation and the International Air Services Transit Agreement. Un-
der these two instruments, aircraft of each of the two countries had the
right to overfly the territory of the other. According to the Application this
r6gime was suspended during a period of hostilities between the two States
in August-September 1965 and was never revived. In February 1966 the
two Governments concluded a special agreement under which a new con-
cession to overfly each other's territory was granted, but on a provisional
basis, on the basis of reciprocity, and subject to the permission of the
Government concerned. After the diversion of an Indian aircraft to Paki-
stan and its destruction at Lahore Airport (30 January-February 1971),
the Government of India suspended overflights of its own aircraft over
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Pakistan territory and withdrew permission for Pakistan aircraft to overfly
the territory of India.
On 3 March 1971 Pakistan submitted the matter to the ICAO Council,
which is empowered to deal with disputes concerning the interpretation or
application of the 1944 Convention and Agreement. India argued that the
Council had no jurisdiction in the present dispute, which related on the
contrary to the termination or suspension of these two instruments in so far
as they concern overflights between two States. On 29 July 1971 the
ICAO Council decided that it had jurisdiction. In its present Application,
India, on the basis of Article 84 of the Convention and Article 11 of the
Agreement, appeals from that decision to the Court.
The Application claims that:
(a) the ICAO Council has no jurisdiction to handle the matters present-
ed by Pakistan, as the 1944 Convention and Agreement have been terminated
or suspended as between the two States;
(b) the ICAO Council has no jurisdiction to consider Pakistan's com-
plaint, since no action has been taken by India under the Agreement; in fact
no action could possibly be taken by India under the Agreement since that
Agreement has been terminated or suspended as between the two States; and
(c) the question of Indian aircraft overflying Pakistan and Pakistan
aircraft overflying India is governed by the special regime of 1966 and not by
the Convention or the Agreement of 1944. Any dispute between the two
States can arise only under the special regime, and the ICAO Council has no
jurisdiction to handle any such dispute.
On 16 September 1971, Vice-President Fouad Ammoun, Acting Presi-
dent in this case under Article 13, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court,
which provides that if the President is a national of one of the parties to a
case brought before the Court, he will abstain from exercising his functions
as President in respect of that case (the present President, Sir Muhammad
Zafrulla Khan, being a national of Pakistan), fixed 16 December 1971 as
the time-limit for the filing of the Memorial of India in this case.
Subsequent procedure is reserved for further decision.
New Declaration of Adherence
On 19 May 1971 the Government of Austria deposited with the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations a declaration whereby it accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, under the
terms of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court.
By that declaration, Austria recognized the jurisdiction of the Court as
compulsory in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation,
except in the case of disputes in respect of which the parties thereto had
International Lawyer, Vol. 6, No. I
Case Comments 203
agreed or should agree to have recourse to other means of peaceful set-
tlement for its final and binding decision.
This declaration brings to 47 the number of States which accept the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36 of the Statute of the
Court, the other 46 States being: Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Cambodia,
Canada, China, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Finland, France, Gambia, Haiti, Honduras, India, Israel, Japan, Kenya,
Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Pan-
ama, Philippines, Portugal, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, and Uruguay.
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